Programm
Regulatory Conception
Jacob Berk
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgien
Ian Hacking proposes Human and Natural Kinds to distinguish two kinds of scientific objects, and the role morality plays in their construction. Natural Kinds, which represent natural scientific objects, do not have a direct moral valence, whereas Human Kinds, which represent objects in the social or ‘human’ sciences, do. Hacking believes the reason Human Kinds are unstable is because the people who are categorized often respond to their categorization, variously internalizing or rejecting it, creating ‘looping effects.’ Rachel Cooper argues that dividing Scientific Kinds in this way is untenable, as the value properties of Human Kinds do not make them unnatural; looping effects may exist, but they are not a sign of not being natural. In this paper, I argue that both authors elide the role of norms in the construction of Human Kinds and the Looping Effects they generate. It is not the naturalness or unnaturalness of a Kind which determines its stability, but the norms that govern its construction and use in popular discourse.
In other words, the matrix of ought-rules that govern the attachment of affective statuses to social-scientific objects, both in scientific conception and popular vulgarization, is as important to looping as any degree of perceived ontological ‘naturalness.’ This means that while I side with Hacking in agreeing that Human Kinds are not natural per se, I think this for different reasons. One implication of this view is that since Human Kinds are morally charged objects that derive their status from discursive rules, their stability (or lack thereof) is not strictly a logical or taxonomical matter, but also an ethical and political one. I conclude by introducing a framework for doing justice to the plural nature of social reality based on pragmatist political theory, called the regulatory conception of Human Kinds, which allows, through a deliberative model, consensus building on the affective-tagging of social scientific objects between social scientists and those they study. The hope is that this conception will resolve looping effects by addressing the epistemic disparities that generate them.
Keywords: Human Kinds, Looping Effects, Ian Hacking, Social Ontology, Philosophy of Social Science